RONHOLT_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

12/9/2012 5:30 PM

WHERE THE WILD THINGS WERE: A
CHANCE TO KEEP ALASKA’S
CHALLENGE OF THE ROADLESS
RULE OUT OF THE SUPREME COURT
KIRSTEN RØNHOLT
INTRODUCTION
In a 2010 decision out of the Tenth Circuit, an injunction against the
Roadless Area Conservation regulations, known as the “Roadless
Rule,”1 was reversed, representing an important step in finally
solidifying federal protection of the inventoried “roadless areas.” The
Roadless Rule prohibits road construction, reconstruction, and timber
harvesting in designated areas.2 Between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,
there are now two major circuit decisions recognizing the validity of the
Roadless Rule. These decisions are significant partly because they were
decided by the two circuits most deeply impacted by the Roadless Rule,
and are thus the most crucial in its survival. The Ninth and Tenth
Circuits contain, respectively, the first and second largest National
Forest lands areas subject to the Roadless Rule among judicial circuits.3
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1. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 (Jan. 12,
2001) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294 (2012)) [hereinafter Roadless Rule].
2. Id.
3. See 2001 Roadless Rule Maps, U.S. FOREST SERV., http://www.fs.fed.us
/maps/ (follow “Roadless Area Conservation Maps” hyperlink) (last visited
Sept. 8, 2012) (The U.S. Forest Service manages more than 190 million acres, of
which nearly 58 million are inventoried roadless areas. Almost sixty percent of
these managed areas, or 122,092,000 acres to be specific, are located within the
Ninth Circuit, 43,274,000 of which are inventoried roadless areas; 41,758,000
acres of National Forest lands are located within the Tenth Circuit’s jurisdiction,
13,313,000 of which are inventoried roadless areas. Thus, between them, the
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Prior to the recent Tenth Circuit decision, the Roadless Rule
endured many political and legal challenges.4 Although the unanimous
circuit decisions staved off the Roadless Rule’s permanent enjoinment,
the State of Alaska is currently attempting to essentially re-try the case
in a new forum.5 This Article focuses on the Roadless Rule’s history6 and
ongoing litigation7, discussing the decisions upholding the Roadless
Rule in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Finally, it analyzes Alaska’s
pending challenge in the District Court for the District of Columbia and
the Roadless Rule’s likely treatment should it reach the Supreme Court.8

I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE ROADLESS RULE
The Organic Administration Act of 18979 established the national
forest system, and articulated a directive of the Forest Service: “No
national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the
forest within . . . or for the purpose of . . . furnish[ing] a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens . . . .”10 From this
auspicious beginning, with two apparently competing interests to
balance, the Forest Service is mandated to provide the public with access
to and use of its forest lands, while simultaneously working to preserve,
improve, and protect them.
Subsequently, the Wilderness Act of 196411 (“Wilderness Act”)

Ninth and Tenth Circuit jurisdictions contain the vast majority of National
Forests and Roadless lands, rendering the decisions by these circuits especially
relevant in terms of the Roadless Rule’s future).
4. See
Timeline
of
the
Roadless
Rule,
EARTH
JUSTICE,
http://earthjustice.org/features/timeline-of-the-roadless-rule (last visited Nov.
6, 2012) (containing a timeline showing various executive efforts to either
suspend or bolster the Roadless Rule).
5. See Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 1:11-cv-01122 (D.D.C. filed June
17, 2011) (State of Alaska claiming that the Roadless Rule violates multiple
National Acts); see also discussion infra Part II.
6. See generally Timeline of the Roadless Rule, supra note 4.
7. See generally TOM TURNER, ROADLESS RULES: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE LAST
WILD FORESTS (2009) (reviewing the history of the Roadless Rule and related
litigation).
8. It merits noting that the Supreme Court very recently refused to grant
certiorari for a Tenth Circuit decision on the Roadless Rule. Wyoming v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 11-1378, 568
U.S. ___ (Oct. 1, 2012); see U.S. Supreme Court Leaves Roadless Rule Standing,
ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 2, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://ensnewswire.com/2012/10/02/u-s-supreme-court-leaves-roadless-rule-standing/
(describing Roadless Rule and the appellate history of the case). Nevertheless,
the threat of future review by the Supreme Court remains.
9. Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2012).
10. Id.
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36 (2006).
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established a procedure by which Congress can designate roadless areas
as “wilderness,”12 which had the effect of keeping them in a primitive
state in perpetuity.13 Looking to preserve and protect forest lands, the
Forest Service began the Roadless Areas Review and Evaluation (“RARE
I”) in 1967—the first attempt to inventory the roadless areas within the
national forest system with the goal of ultimately recommending certain
lands to Congress as appropriate for wilderness designation.14 Almost
ten years later, in 1976, after a district court outlawed clear-cutting
nationwide,15 Congress passed the National Forestry Management Act16
(“NFMA”), “allow[ing] the Forest Service to resume clear-cutting with
certain restrictions” and accomplish its other interest.17 NFMA required
the Forest Service to “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land
and resource management plans for units of the National Forest
System . . . . “18
In 1977, the Forest Service began RARE II, its second attempt to
inventory the roadless areas within its jurisdiction.19 This effort,
however, was short-lived; a successful court challenge, brought under
the National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”)20 against the
Forest Service’s wilderness designation procedure, halted any further
action by the Forest Service.21 When it became clear that there would be
no RARE III, Congress took control of roadless area policy by enacting
numerous bills to establish wilderness designations on a state-by-state

12. Id. § 1132(c).
13. Id. § 1131(a)–(c); see also TURNER, supra note 7, at 22 (noting that the
Wilderness Act immediately set aside 9.1 million acres of national forest land
and gave Congress the power to set aside more unspoiled areas).
14. See 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (describing the process of review).
15. See generally W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 367
F. Supp. 422 (N.D. W. Va. 1973) aff’d, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
16. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–14 (2012).
17. TURNER, supra note 7, at 23 (citing Butz, 367 F. Supp. at 422).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a).
19. See Christopher Cumings, Judicial Iron Triangles: The Roadless Rule to
Nowhere—And What Can be Done to Free the Forest Service’s Rulemaking Process, 61
OKLA. L. REV. 801, 805–06 (2008) (RARE II was completed in 1979; the inventory
identified 62 million acres as roadless areas within the national forest system
and recommended to Congress 15.1 million acres as appropriate for wilderness
designation).
20. National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012)
(NEPA establishes a national environmental policy and goals for the protection,
maintenance, and enhancement of the environment. It also provides a process
for implementing these goals and a series of procedural requirements that
safeguard the constitutionality and legitimacy of any major federal
environmental action.).
21. See generally California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the Forest Service was not properly complying with NEPA).
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basis.22
In 1998, a survey revealed that the Forest Service faced an $8.4
billion backlog of road maintenance and construction.23 A year later, the
Forest Service Chief published the “Interim Roadless Rule,” placing an
eighteen-month moratorium on road building in national roadless
areas.24 In a move met with wide public support,25 the Clinton
administration promulgated the “Roadless Area Conservation”
regulations, known as the “Roadless Rule.” The Roadless Rule,
eventually adopted and made effective on March 13, 2001, established
lasting protection for inventoried roadless areas in the National Forest
System.26 It set limits on road construction, reconstruction, and timber
harvesting in designated areas, stating that these activities have the
greatest potential for altering and fragmenting landscapes, which, in
turn, would lead to immediate and long-term decline in the value and
characteristics of roadless areas.27 The environment’s health was in need
of serious consideration on a national level, and, to that end, the Forest
Service was granted authority to examine the “whole picture” of land
management for roadless areas by implementing a nationwide
management system.28
In essence, the Roadless Rule forbids road construction and logging

22. See, e.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No.
96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.);
California Wilderness Act of 1984, 16 U.S.C. § 543; Oregon Wilderness Act of
1984, 16 U.S.C. § 460oo (2012); Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, 16
U.S.C. § 460pp (2012).
23. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ROADLESS AREA CONSERVATION FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOLUME 1, at 1–5 (2000) (“Agency has an
$8.4 billion backlog in deferred maintenance, road reconstruction, and bridge
and culvert maintenance and replacement on the more than 386,000 miles in the
Forest Transportation System.”).
24. Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System:
Temporary Suspension of Road Construction and Reconstruction in Unroaded
Areas, 36 C.F.R. § 212 (2012); see also Wyo. Timber Indus. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Wyo. 2000) (challenging the interim rule).
25. See TURNER, supra note 7, at 35. Over one hundred members of Congress
wrote to the president urging protection for roadless areas, and over a quartermillion emails supporting the moratorium crashed White House servers in a
single weekend in June 1999. Id.
26. Roadless Rule, supra note 1, at 3244.
27. Id. at 3245 (The Roadless Rule discusses concerns for high quality or
undisturbed soil, water, and air; sources of public drinking water; diversity of
plant and animal communities; habitats for threatened and endangered species
or those dependent on large areas of land; motorized and semi-primitive
motorized classes of dispersed recreation; reference landscapes; natural
landscapes with scenic quality; cultural properties and sacred sites; and other
locally identified unique characteristics.).
28. Id. at 3246.
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in inventoried roadless areas, which comprise about one third (58.5
million acres) of the National Forest System.29 The rule had two
elements: a “Prohibition Rule,” which banned road construction and
reconstruction in inventoried roadless areas, and a “Procedural Rule,”
which required forest managers to identify additional roadless areas and
determine whether they warranted elevated protection.30
The Roadless Rule does not restrict access to inventoried roadless
areas, but instead prevents the construction of new roads and
reconstruction of existing roads.31 It does not, as some assume, prohibit
any sort of activity or development in an area, eliminating all economic
use the land could provide.
Furthermore, the Roadless Rule includes several exceptions to the
general prohibition against roadbuilding and timber harvesting in
inventoried roadless areas. It allows for forest management activities
that do not require the construction of new roads,32 construction or
reconstruction of roads when necessary for public safety, response
actions, and other events,33 and even allows for certain exceptions to the
general prohibition against timber harvesting in roadless areas.34
Moreover, the Roadless Rule was intended to have a negligible real
impact on timber sales nationwide, as the industry had already
experienced sharp declines in the previous decade. To that end, the
availability of timbered lands would not be affected.35
A.

The First Challenges to the Roadless Rule in Court

The State of Idaho was the first to challenge the proposed rule,
claiming that the Forest Service’s scoping process violated NEPA,36 but

29. Id. at 3244–45.
30. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,276, 30,288
(May 10, 2000).
31. See Roadless Rule, supra note 1, at 3249–50 (“[T]he final rule merely
prohibits the construction of new roads and the reconstruction of existing roads
in inventoried roadless areas.”).
32. Id. at 3250 (“[M]anagement actions that do not require the construction of
new roads will still be allowed . . . .”).
33. Id. at 3272–73 (listing circumstances under which a road may be
constructed).
34. Id. at 3273 (listing circumstances under which timber can be cut, sold,
and removed in roadless areas).
35. TURNER, supra note 7, at 36.
36. Scoping is required by NEPA regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2012)
(“There shall be an early and open process for determining the scope of issues to
be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed
action.”).
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the suit was dismissed.37 On January 8, 2001, only three days after the
Roadless Rule took effect, the Kootenai Tribe and others filed suit in the
District of Idaho, alleging that the Roadless Rule was illegal and violated
both NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act.38 Before the District
Court published its opinion, President Bush postponed the Roadless
Rule’s effective date to May 12, 2001.39
The State of Alaska also challenged the Roadless Rule. Specifically,
Alaska sought to prevent its application to the Tongass National Forest,
and, ultimately, the state reached a separate settlement with the Forest
Service promulgating a new rule exempting the Tongass from the
Roadless Rule.40 This was a huge setback for the Roadless Rule, given
that the Tongass National Forest is the country’s largest tract of national
forest land; under the Tongass exemption Alaska was essentially
removed from the Roadless Rule’s reach.41 However, this out of court
settlement did not affect other states, and Idaho’s challenge continued.
Despite postponement of the effective date, the Idaho District Court
issued a nationwide injunction.42 The Ninth Circuit subsequently
vacated the injunction, holding that the district court had abused its
discretion in enjoining the rule.43 The Court of Appeals determined that
beyond providing adequate notice, the affirmative duties NEPA
imposes are actually rather limited, so that the plaintiff’s allegations of
procedural invalidity44 were insufficient to support an injunction.45 The
37. Idaho v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV99-611-N-EJL, 2000 WL 33417326, at *1
(D. Idaho Feb. 18, 2000).
38. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 (D.
Idaho 2001) [hereinafter Kootenai I].
39. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630
F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Kootenai II].
40. See Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Release No. 0200.03, USDA Retains
National Forests Roadless Area Conservation Rule (June 9, 2003); see also Special
Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the Tongass National
Forest, Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg. 75, 136 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §
294) (temporarily exempting the Tongass National Forest from prohibitions
against timber harvest, road construction, and reconstruction in inventoried
roadless areas).
41. Until last year, Alaska found itself removed from the litigation
surrounding the Roadless Rule. A District Court decision reinstating the
Roadless Rule in the Tongass, discussed infra Part II.3, and a renewed challenge
to the Rule in the District of Columbia have brought Alaska back into the
ongoing litigation of the Rule.
42. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, No. CV01-10-N-EJL, 2001 WL
1141275, at *2 (D. Idaho May 10, 2001) (“The Forest Service is HEREBY
ENJOINED from implementing all aspects of the Roadless Area Conservation
Rule.”) (emphasis in original).
43. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1104.
44. See id. at 1117 (The plaintiffs complained that the Forest Service violated
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Court of Appeals also held that the Forest Service was not required to
issue a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the
addition of 4.2 million acres of previously unidentified roadless areas to
the final EIS.46
Most importantly, the Court of Appeals held that the Forest Service
impact statements analyzed an adequate range of alternatives as
required by NEPA,47 and held that the Forest Service was not required
under NEPA to consider alternatives in its EIS that were inconsistent
with its basic policy objectives.48 Since the decision was published, the
greatest criticisms have focused on the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the
Roadless Rule’s purpose, particularly the panel’s unsupported claims
that “the policy of NEPA is first and foremost to protect the natural
environment.”49 Although critics claim that this is an overbroad and
liberal reading of NEPA’s language that offers unfounded support for a
bad rule, the Ninth Circuit’s decision granted the Forest Service the
same presumption of lawful rulemaking that many agencies enjoy in
court.50 The Ninth Circuit also held that the Forest Service’s
promulgation of the Roadless Rule complied with Congress’s intent in
drafting NEPA.51 This was the first clear affirmation of the Roadless
Rule’s constitutionality, a good indicator of its long-term legitimacy and
survival (at least within the Ninth Circuit), and a major victory for its
supporters.
The State of Wyoming filed its own suit challenging the rule, and a
federal district court enjoined the rule’s nationwide application in July
2003, reaching its own finding that the Forest Service had violated
NEPA and the Wilderness Act.52 However, after the Bush administration
NEPA’s “hard look” requirement by not providing maps of the potential
affected areas at the scoping period. The Court disagreed, noting that the Forest
Service had provided maps of the affected areas prior to issuing the draft EIS
and had been engaged in ongoing studies and discussions with the plaintiffs for
several years.).
45. Id. at 1104.
46. Id. at 1118.
47. Id. at 1120 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14).
48. Id. at 1121–22.
49. See id. at 1123 (“NEPA may not be used to preclude lawful conservation
measures by the Forest Service and to force federal agencies, in contravention of
their own policy objectives, to develop and degrade scarce environmental
resources.”).
50. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s
policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by
Congress, the challenge must fail.”).
51. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1120.
52. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1239 (D. Wyo.
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passed the State Petition Rule53 in 2005, all pending legal challenges to
the Roadless Rule were rendered moot, and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the Wyoming district court’s 2003 injunction.54
B.

The Effective Repeal of the Roadless Rule by the State Petition
Act

The new State Petition Act, dramatically different from the
Roadless Rule, allowed governors from each state with roadless areas to
petition the Secretary of Agriculture to establish their own management
plans for roadless areas.55 Individual state action allowed for greater
flexibility, but also for far greater exceptions in terms of destruction of
forested lands.56
The Forest Service explained that the state petitioning process
established by the new rule would “allow State-specific consideration of
the needs of these areas,”57 with the purpose of “[setting] forth a process
for State-specific rulemaking to address the management of inventoried
roadless areas . . . .”58 The Forest Service also explained that because the
State Petition Rule was “merely procedural in nature and in scope” and
thus would have “no direct, indirect, or cumulative effect on the
environment,” it could be categorically excluded from the procedural
requirements of NEPA.59 Under this exclusion, the Forest Service could
implement the rule without complying with even the most basic
requirements of NEPA, including the crucial EIS.60
2003), vacated 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005).
53. See generally Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area
Management, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,654 (May 13, 2005) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294).
54. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, No. 11-1378, 568 U.S. ___ (Oct. 1, 2012).
55. Notably, the regulations provided no standards or criteria to guide the
Secretary of Agriculture in responding to a petition. See William J. Wailand, A
New Direction? Forest Service Decisionmaking and Management of National Forest
Roadless Areas, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 418, 418 (2006) (suggesting that the absence of
standards may reflect an attempt to open roadless areas to development).
56. See Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area
Management, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,654. One concern regarding the Roadless Rule
was “the need for flexibility and exceptions to allow for needed resource
management activities,” because the “inflexible ‘one-size-fits-all’ nationwide
rulemaking approach is flawed and there are better means to achieve protection
of roadless area values.” Id. at 25,656.
57. Id. at 25,655.
58. Id. at 25,661 (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.10).
59. Id. at 25,660.
60. Id. (“[T]he Department’s assessment is that this final rule falls within
FSH 1909.15, Section 31.1b and no extraordinary circumstances exist which
would require preparation of an environmental assessment or an environmental
impact statement.”).
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The Forest Service had clearly anticipated challenges to the 2005
rule, and therefore included a severability provision in the Roadless
Rule to keep in effect any portions not invalidated pursuant to judicial
review, and to block reinstatement of the old Roadless Rule.61 Several
states, including California, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington,
almost immediately brought suit against the United States Department
of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the Forest Service alleging violations of
NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and the rationality requirement of
the Administrative Procedure Act.62
C.

Reinstatement of the Roadless Rule in the Ninth Circuit and
Injunction in the Tenth Circuit

The Northern District of California invalidated the State Petition
Act and reinstated the Roadless Rule in 2006.63 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the Forest Service had violated both NEPA and
the Endangered Species Act by adopting an approach to roadless area
management in 2005 that was less protective of the environment than
the approach reflected in the 2001 Roadless Rule, without considering
the effects of the change on the environment as required under either
statute.64
Wyoming brought suit in response to the California District Court
decision, and successfully enjoined the revitalization of the Rule.65 A
District Court in Washington issued a decision presuming that the 2001
Roadless Rule nevertheless remained in force, and went unchallenged.66
In response, the California District Court modified the scope of its
nationwide injunction, as a matter of judicial comity, so that the
61. Id. at 25,656 (“The Department wishes to make its intent clear that should
all or any part of this regulation be set aside, the Department does not intend
that the prior rule be reinstated, in whole or in part.”); see also 36 C.F.R. § 294.18
(2005) (“In the event that any provision . . . is determined . . . to be invalid . . . the
remaining provisions . . . shall remain in full force and effect.”).
62. See generally California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp.
2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
63. Id. at 916.
64. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th
Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Lockyer] (holding that the USDA and the Forest Service
violated NEPA by failing to comply with the environmental analysis
requirement, violated the Endangered Species Act by failing to engage in the
proper consultation before implementing the State Petitions Rule, and that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by enjoining the State Petitions Rule
and reinstating the Roadless Rule); see also discussion infra Part II.1.
65. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1350–55 (D. Wyo.
2008).
66. Hogback Basin Pres. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1146
(W.D. Wash. 2008).
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injunction of the State Petition Act was narrowly applied only within the
Ninth Circuit and in New Mexico.67 States outside the Ninth Circuit
began the process of requesting the Secretary of Agriculture to issue
individual state determinations.68

II. LOCKYER AND WYOMING: HOW THE NINTH AND TENTH
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS FINALLY GOT IT RIGHT
A.

The Lockyer Court Enjoins the State Petition Act

In Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit considered how the State Petitions
Rule promulgated by the USDA affected the Roadless Rule.69 Although
courts must generally defer to administrative agencies unless their
actions are “arbitrary and capricious,”70 the Ninth Circuit noted that the
State Petitions Rule effectively repealed the Roadless Rule, and thus
should be subject to review under NEPA71 because its implementation
could not be considered “procedural only.”72 Consequently, since a
drastic change in regulation, such as effectively repealing the Roadless
Rule, was certainly enough to trigger NEPA public notice and comment,
the court found that the USDA did not properly assert a valid reason for
its classification of the State Petitions Rule as a categorical exemption
under NEPA.73 The court further found that the USDA had violated
NEPA by arbitrarily determining that the State Petitions Rule would
have no effect on listed species or habitats.74
Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court of the
Northern District of California did not abuse its discretion by reinstating
the Roadless Rule,75 stating that “[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature,
67. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 710 F. Supp. 2d 916, 924
(N.D. Cal. 2008).
68. See, e.g., Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the
National Forests in Idaho, 73 Fed. Reg. 1135 (Jan. 7, 2008) (codified at 36 C.F.R. §
294); Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the National
Forests in Colorado, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,544 (July 25, 2008) (codified at 36 C.F.R. §
294).
69. See Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1011 (describing “arbitrary and capricious”
standard for review).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 1014–17 (stating “the promulgation of the State Petitions Rule
necessarily encompassed the permanent repeal of the Roadless Rule’s
substantive protections” yet “the USDA could cite no occasion when [NEPA’s]
categorical exclusion was used to repeal a rule with substantive effects on land
management”).
72. Id. at 1016–17.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1019.
75. Id. at 1020.
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can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and . . . ,
therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an
injunction to protect the environment.”76 Alone among the Circuit
Courts of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit considers the invalidation of an
agency rule to cause the agency’s prior rule to be reinstated.77 Under this
precedent, the court concluded that the District Court rightfully
reinstated the Roadless Rule in order to prevent further harm to roadless
areas, gave meaningful consideration to the balancing of harm, and as
such there was no abuse of discretion.78
B.

The Tenth Circuit Reverses the Permanent Injunction of the
Roadless Rule

Contrary to expectations,79 the Tenth Circuit reversed the District
Court of Wyoming’s injunction of the Roadless Rule. The Appeals Court
reviewed de novo the State of Wyoming’s challenge to the Roadless Rule,
and held that the Roadless Rule did not contravene the Wilderness Act,80
the Forest Service had acted within its authority under the Organic Act
and the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (“MUSYA”)81 to regulate
National Forest lands,82 and the Forest Service fully complied with the
requirements of NEPA.83
Although the Tenth Circuit tracked the opinion of the lower court,
evaluating the same arguments with the same evidence, it emerged with
vastly divergent results.84 Comparing the aims of the Wilderness Act
with those of the Roadless Act, the court determined that the two acts
are not functionally equivalent and the Roadless Rule does not violate
the Wilderness Act by creating de facto wilderness.85 The Tenth Circuit
echoed the Ninth Circuit in holding that the Forest Service possesses

76. Id. (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531,
545 (1987)).
77. Id. (quoting Paulson v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005)).
76. Id.
79. See Kyle J. Aarons, Note, The Real World Roadless Rules Challenges, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1293, 1311 (2011) (providing a lively defense of the merits of the
District Court of Wyoming’s opinion enjoining the Roadless Rule and
predictions that the 10th Circuit would affirm District Judge Brimmer’s opinion).
80. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1234 (10th Cir. 2011).
81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–31.
82. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1235.
83. Id. at 1253–54.
84. Id. at 1228–42.
85. Id. at 1229–30. The Court also pointed out that the Roadless Rule, which
provides broader exceptions for when new road construction or reconstruction
can occur, is less restrictive in terms of “grazing,” and allows for mineral
development to a greater extent than the Wilderness Act. Id. at 1232–33.
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broad discretion to regulate national forests, including for conservation
purposes.86
1.

The Roadless Rule did not violate the Wilderness Act because it did
not establish de facto wilderness areas
In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit evaluated Wyoming’s claim that
the Roadless Rule constituted a de facto designation of “wilderness” in
contravention of the Wilderness Act.”87 The court analyzed the language
of both regulations, noting that the Wilderness Act defined “wilderness”
as “an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled
by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain,” as well as
“an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character
and influence, without permanent improvements or human
habitation.”88
As previously discussed, the Wilderness Act prohibits any
“permanent” or “temporary road,” and road maintenance activities,
subject to limited exceptions, and prohibits any use of motor vehicles.89
On the other hand, the Roadless Rule restricts only road construction
and commercial timber harvesting, while allowing existing classified
roads90 to be maintained.
The court ultimately held that “[t]hese distinctions clearly
demonstrate that wilderness areas governed by the Wilderness Act and
[inventoried roadless areas] governed by the Roadless Rule are not only
distinct, but that the Wilderness Act is more restrictive and prohibitive
than the Roadless Rule.”91 Since “the [inventoried roadless areas]
governed by the Roadless Rule are not de facto administrative wilderness
areas,” the court determined the district court erred by holding
otherwise.92
2.

The Roadless Rule Was Promulgated Pursuant to Broad Authority
Granted by Congress in the Organic Act
The court next addressed “whether the Forest Service otherwise
acted within its statutory authority in promulgating the Roadless
Rule.”93 The court found that “[t]he Organic Act gives the Forest Service
broad discretion to regulate the national forests, including for
86. Id. at 1270.
87. Id. at 1229.
88. Id. at 1228.
89. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012); 36 C.F.R. § 293.6.
90. Protection of Inventoried Roadless Areas, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3250–51
(Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(c)).
91. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1233.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1234.
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conservation purposes[,]”94 and this broad rulemaking authority
granted to the Forest Service under the Organic Act “is alone sufficient
to support the Forest Service’s promulgation of the Roadless Rule.”95
The court continued its analysis, further finding support in
MUSYA, which grants the Forest Service broad discretion in its
authority to manage NFS lands,96 and states that “establishment and
maintenance of areas of wilderness are consistent with the purposes and
provisions of [the Act],”97 “to be supplemental to, but not in derogation
of,” the Organic Act.98 The Court of Appeals finally concluded that “the
Forest Service had the authority . . . to promulgate a rule protecting NFS
lands through restrictions on commercial logging and road
construction” under both the Organic Act and MUSYA.99
Wyoming reasserted its MUSYA claim as an alternate ground for
affirming the district court’s injunction of the Roadless Rule, arguing
that the Roadless Rule was inconsistent with MUSYA purposes because
it applied a “one size fits all approach.”100 The court, however, noted
that “contrary to Wyoming’s argument, the [Roadless Rule] conforms to
the multiple-use mandate of MUSYA, including management of NFS
lands for ‘outdoor recreation,’ ‘watershed,’ and ‘wildlife and fish
purposes.’”101 The Court admitted that “the Roadless Rule does not
permit all uses specifically identified in MUSYA—namely, ‘timber’
purposes” but correctly pointed out that this is not required under
MUSYA.102 The Forest Service has acted properly under the limitations
of both the Organic Act and MUSYA in promulgating the Roadless Rule.
3.

The Forest Service Complied with the Mandates of NEPA and Did
Not Act Arbitrarily and Capriciously in Conducting Its NEPA
Analysis.
The court then reviewed NEPA. Wyoming asserted that in
promulgating the Roadless Rule, the Forest Service violated the NEPA
by failing to: conduct adequate scoping, grant Wyoming cooperatingagency status, consider a reasonable range of alternatives, consider the
cumulative impacts of the proposed action, prepare a supplemental EIS
and take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 1235 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2012).
Id. § 528.
Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1235.
Id. at 1266–67.
Id. at 1267–68.
Id. at 1268.
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action.103 Several of these arguments were summarily struck down, so
only the most crucial to the Rule’s legitimacy and to its future
defensibility will be discussed.
a.

The Forest Service reasonably limited the range of alternatives
to those that furthered the defined purpose of the Roadless Rule
The district court’s opinion contains a noticeable thread of bias,
resulting in a flawed opinion that erroneously found every Forest
Service decision arbitrary and capricious regardless of the record. The
district court had held that the Forest Service violated NEPA by
“‘fail[ing] to rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable
alternatives’” to the proposed action.104 The Tenth Circuit, however,
found that the Forest Service “satisfied NEPA’s requirements by
analyzing a full range of reasonable alternatives that would satisfy” the
purpose of the Roadless Rule.105 As the court stated, “[u]nder NEPA, our
role in reviewing the Forest Service’s EIS ‘is simply to ensure that the
agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental
impact of its actions.’”106 The court concluded that the Forest Service
considered a reasonable range of alternatives in detail in the EIS,
reasonably limited those alternatives for consideration to the ones that
furthered the defined purpose of the Roadless Rule, and gathered
sufficient information to “take a hard look at the environmental impacts
of the proposed [rule] and its alternatives.” 107
b.

The Forest Service did not impermissibly predetermine the
outcome of the Roadless Rule proceeding
The last section of the appellate court’s NEPA analysis is
noteworthy, because it begins by stating that even if the district court
were correct that “the end-product of the Roadless Rule NEPA process
was ‘predetermined’ and ‘preordained,’ it never decisively concluded
that ‘predetermination’ or ‘bias’ constituted a separate ground for relief
under NEPA.”108 In fact, “[i]n analyzing the environmental impacts of a
proposed action under NEPA, agency officials are not required to be
‘subjectively impartial.’”109
The regulations promulgated by the Center for Environmental
Quality, the reviewing body for the Environmental Protection Agency

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1243, 1247.
Id. at 1256–57.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1263.
Id. (emphasis added).
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and other environmental agencies, expressly indicate that an “‘agency can
have a preferred alternative in mind when it conducts a NEPA
analysis[,]’”110 so long as the agency takes the requisite “hard look”
under NEPA.111 The court, defining “predetermination” as occurring
only when an agency “irreversibly and irretrievably commits itself to a
plan of action that is dependent upon the NEPA environmental analysis
producing a certain outcome,”112 makes it clear that “predetermination
is different in kind from mere ‘subjective impartiality[,]’” which “‘does
not undermine an agency’s ability to engage in the requisite hard look at
environmental consequences . . . .’”113
After reviewing the record, the court concluded that “the Forest
Service did not irreversibly and irretrievably commit itself to a certain
outcome before it had completed it NEPA analysis.”114 Wyoming
“simply [did] not satisfy the stringent standard applicable to claims of
predetermination under NEPA.”115 The Forest Service did not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in conducting its NEPA analysis in
promulgating the Roadless Rule.116
In its final order, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court
abused its discretion in permanently enjoining the Roadless Rule on a
nationwide basis.117 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed,118 bringing
the Tenth Circuit in line with the Ninth Circuit and effectively
reestablishing the Roadless Rule nationwide.

III. ALASKA IN THE FEDERAL COURTS AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFECT
ON CIRCUIT SPLIT
In June 2011, the State of Alaska filed the most recent challenge to
the Roadless Rule in the District of Columbia District Court.119 This suit
was brought both in response to a decision in the District of Alaska
striking the Tongass exemption and reinstating the Roadless Rule,120 and
as a means of relitigating in a new forum to avoid the Ninth Circuit’s

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1264.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1265.
116. Id. at 1266.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 1, Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 1:11-cv01122 (D.D.C. filed June 17, 2011).
120. Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 776 F. Supp. 2d 960, 976–
77 (D. Alaska 2011).
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Lockyer precedent.121 The challenge focuses on the Tongass and Chugach
national forests in Alaska, but also seeks to strike down the rule
nationwide.122 While the case raises many of the same claims as previous
challenges to the Rule,123 claims which have been rejected both by the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, it also includes claims specific to Alaska: it is
alleged that the Roadless Rule violates the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”)124 and the Tongass Land
Management Plan of 2008.125
Alaska has filed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act126
and the Declaratory Judgment Act,127 alleging violations of ANILCA, the
Tongass Timber Reform Act, the Wilderness Act, NFMA, NEPA,
MUSYA, the Organic Administration Act, and the Administrative
Procedure Act.128 Alaska recites nearly verbatim the argument presented
in the District of Wyoming’s now overruled opinion.129 Alaska alleged
that the USDA arbitrarily and capriciously denied multiple requests to
extend the comment period, denied adequate information and maps to
interested parties, denied requests from ten states to participate in the
rulemaking as cooperating agencies, failed to consider adequate
alternatives to “roadlessness,” and refused to provide an exception for
access to new leasable minerals.130 Alaska further alleged that the
ANILCA should never have been extended to the Tongass National
Forest.131

121. See Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (“This case involves
procedural challenges to a United States Forest Service rule, known commonly
as the ‘Roadless Rule,’ with a potential environmental impact restricting
development in national forest lands representing about two percent of the
United States land mass.”).
122. Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 1, Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 1:11-cv01122 (D.D.C. filed June 17, 2011).
123. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1209; California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 575 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2009).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (1980).
125. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶ 1.
126. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).
127. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012).
128. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶ 1.
129. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1319–20 (D. Wyo.
2008). The State of Alaska apparently never contemplated that the Tenth Circuit
would so soundly reject the reasoning of its lower court, and therefore assumed
that the arguments it made in accordance with the opinion of the District of
Wyoming would have a foregone conclusion in Alaska’s favor. Alaska will likely
benefit from extensive briefing to downplay the significance of the Tenth Circuit
decision overruling the District of Wyoming, as well as the Supreme Court’s
subsequent decision to deny certiorari.
130. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 120, at ¶¶ 10–36.
131. Id.
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Alaska’s Challenge Properly Belongs in the Ninth Circuit

The State of Alaska is re-opening litigation on a new front, in what
appears to be blatant forum shopping. There is a significant risk that by
filing a second case in a different circuit, the State is attempting to
circumvent stare decisis in the Ninth Circuit.
While the operative facts and impact of this case are linked to the
District of Columbia, they are more properly linked to the District of
Alaska.132 It is undisputed law in the District of Columbia that “[w]hen
the events occur in more than one district, a court can consider which
jurisdiction has the stronger factual nexus to the claims.”133 The State of
Alaska can claim that venue in the District of Columbia is proper
because the subject matter of the suit, the application of the Roadless
Rule and the enjoinment of the Tongass Exemption, arises out of and is
connected with transactions that occurred in, and regulations
promulgated by agencies headquartered in, the District of Columbia.
This assertion, however, is not enough to overcome the more substantial
nexus the State of Alaska has with the District of Alaska, in the Ninth
Circuit.
Courts in the District of Columbia, in particular amongst federal
courts, examine venue challenges carefully in order “to guard against
the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District of
Columbia.”134 The problem with Alaska filing in the District of
Columbia is not only that it avoids stare decisis in the Ninth Circuit, but it
forces defendants and intervenor-defendants in the controversy to
relitigate claims previously tried and determined in the Ninth Circuit.
In fact, several of the plaintiff’s claims have already been litigated in the
Ninth Circuit Kootenai case, a decision supported by the Tenth Circuit
Wyoming case.135
Transferring this case to the District of Alaska serves the interests of
justice in that it will discourage forum shopping by the plaintiff. The
District of Columbia “cannot find that it is in the interest of justice to
encourage, or even allow, a plaintiff to select one district exclusively or

132. See Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2000). In
prior litigation of a similar challenge to an agency rule, the extensive
involvement of the Secretary of the Interior in the conduct of various
environmental studies relating to the conduct of oil and gas resources in Alaska
supported venue in D.C. because of “the national scope of the environmental
issue.” Id.
133. Miller v. Insulation Contractors, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C.
2009).
134. Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
135. Discussed supra, Section II.
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primarily to obtain or avoid specific precedents, particularly in
circumstances such as these where the relevant law is unsettled and the
choice of forum may well dictate the outcome of the case.”136 “[M]ere
involvement . . . on the part of federal agencies, or some federal officials
who are located in Washington, D.C. is not determinative” of whether
the plaintiff’s choice of forum receives deference.137
Because the focus of Alaska’s litigation in the District of Columbia
is the Roadless Rule’s application in the State of Alaska, and this
litigation is inextricably intertwined with the appeal in the Ninth Circuit
requesting reinstatement of the Tongass Exemption, the District Court
for the District of Columbia is an inappropriate venue. Alaska’s case
should be transferred to a court in the Ninth Circuit for adjudication.
B.

The District of Columbia should follow the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits in upholding the Roadless Rule.

Because NEPA, NFMA, MUSYA, and the Wilderness Act do not
provide a private right of action, the court must review the Forest
Service’s promulgation of the Roadless Rule as a “final agency action”
under the Administrative Procedure Act.138 The Administrative
Procedure Act provides for judicial review of final agency action, and
requires the agency to have examined relevant data and to articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action.139 “The determination whether the
[agency] acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner rests on whether it
‘articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.’”140
In its complaint to the District Court of the District of Columbia, the

136. Schmidt Labs., Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 654 F. Supp.
734, 737 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Turner & Newall PLC v. Canadian Universal Ins.
Co., 652 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (D.D.C. 1987); but see Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F.
Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), remanded, 623 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1980) (opining
that “[f]orum shopping is no more an evil than any other tactical determination
a party makes in its behalf. Any competent lawyer chooses a forum with his or
her client’s interest in mind.”).
137. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47
(D.D.C. 2009) (transferring case and refusing to defer to the plaintiffs’ choice of
forum, despite the fact that “the administrative action at issue . . . arose in
Washington”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Starnes v.
McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 925 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
139. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
140. Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t. of Trans., 316 F.3d 1002, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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State of Alaska alleges that the Roadless Rule violates ANILCA141 and
the Tongass Timber Reform Act (“TTRA”)142 by setting aside nearly 15
million acres of roadless areas in the Tongass and Chugach forests
without congressional authorization.143 Even if these claims were
appropriate for the District Court of the District of Columbia to review,
rather than transferring them to the Ninth Circuit, where they are
already being reviewed on appeal,144 they face a difficult battle.
This appeal has weight, as the Tongass was initially regulated
separately from the Roadless Rule and Alaska’s interests are directly
injured by the application of the Rule to the Tongass National Forest.
However, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have both reviewed the
authority of the Forest Service to promulgate the Roadless Rule, and its
compliance with NEPA procedure in doing so.145 While the State of
Alaska claims that the Forest Service violated its mandate under the
Organic Act and MUSYA,146 the Tenth Circuit has clearly stated that
“the Forest Service had the authority to promulgate a rule protecting
NFS lands through restrictions on commercial logging and road
construction” under both Acts.147 The D.C. District Court is unlikely to
reach a different conclusion than the Tenth Circuit on this issue, and
Alaska faces an uphill battle in persuading the court of its position.
Alaska also demands remedy for the violation of the Wilderness
Act, alleging that the Roadless Rule mandates management of
inventoried roadless areas in the national forests as de facto wilderness.148
However, as discussed supra, the Tenth Circuit has definitively
addressed this argument, holding that “the [inventoried roadless areas]
governed by the Roadless Rule are not de facto [sic] administrative
wilderness areas.”149 Almost anticipating Alaska’s argument, the court

141. 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012), et seq. Under ANILCA, Congress intended to
preserve certain lands and waters in the State of Alaska “that contain nationally
significant natural, scenic, historic, archeological, geological, scientific,
wilderness, cultural, recreational, and wildlife values. . . .” Id. § 3101(a).
142. 16 U.S.C. § 539d (2012). The TTRA represents another Congressional
attempt to legislate specifically to Alaska, providing for separate management of
the Tongass National Forest. Id.
143. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶ 57.
144. See Order, Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 11-35517
(9th Cir. filed June 17, 2011).
145. For discussion of the decisions in Wyoming v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 661
F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2011) and Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, (9th Cir. 2011), which
reviewed the Forest Service’s authority to promulgate the Roadless Rule and its
compliance with NEPA procedure, see supra Section II.
146. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 79–83.
147. Wyoming, 661 F.3d 1209, 1235 (10th Cir. 2011).
148. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶ 66.
149. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1233.
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specifically addressed the probable restrictions on mining interests,
noting that “the Roadless Rule imposes no general prohibition on
mining or mineral-development activities, other than the limitations
imposed through the road-building prohibition[, and] the exceptions to
the Roadless Rule’s road-building prohibition would also permit new
road construction or reconstruction for mineral development in certain
situations.”150
In sum, the State of Alaska points to no language indicating the
Tenth Circuit misread the statutes in question in its lengthy analysis of
the legality of the Roadless Rule. Alaska alleges that the Forest Service
violated its mandate under NFMA to manage each national forest in
accordance with a comprehensive forest plan.151 However, the Tenth
Circuit looked at Wyoming’s NFMA claim and held that it was not
viable because the Roadless Rule was promulgated pursuant to the
authority granted in the Organic Act and MUSYA, and therefore does
not need to comply with the provisions of NFMA.152 The State of Alaska
further alleges in its NEPA claims that the Forest Service repeatedly
violated NEPA in promulgating the Roadless Conservation Areas
regulation.153 Despite Alaska’s assertions of wrongdoing, the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits both found no procedural violations under NEPA in the
promulgation of the Roadless Rule.154 The D.C. District Court is again
unlikely to stray from this holding in conflict with its sister courts.
The State of Alaska reiterates the old argument that the Roadless
Rule should be struck down nationwide as violating the Administrative
Procedure Act.155 The Administrative Procedure Act requires an agency
action to be held unlawful and set aside if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law” or in
excess of statutory authority.156 However, as the State of Alaska’s prior
six claims will likely fail, the District of Columbia cannot set aside the
Roadless Rule, under these criteria, as arbitrary or capricious, not in
accordance with the law, nor as action taken by the Forest Service in
excess of its statutory authority.157
Alaska’s best approach, if the case is to be transferred home to the
Ninth Circuit, would be to abandon the arguments already well settled
by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and attack the rationale of the Kootenai
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1232–33.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 67–70.
Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1271–72.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 71–78.
Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1266.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 84–91.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 85–86.
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II decision. The Kootenai II majority overturned the District of Idaho’s
injunction based on its finding that the Roadless Rule furthered the
substantive goals of NEPA.158 This position is inconsistent with
precedent holding that NEPA is primarily a procedural act, with its
substantive policy not legally enforceable.159 The majority went further,
asserting that the “NEPA alternatives requirement [part of the EIS
process] must be interpreted less stringently when the proposed agency
action has a primary and central purpose to conserve and protect the
natural environment.”160 This holding essentially allows an agency to
violate the procedural requirements of NEPA so long as the substance of
the action is pro-environment.161 This is the great weakness of the Ninth
Circuit precedent, and the only place Alaska has a chance of success on
the merits. However, at the end of the day it may not be enough to force
an injunction of the Rule in the Ninth Circuit.
Finally, the allegations that the Forest Service also violated the
Regulatory Flexibility Act162 and the Administrative Procedure Act
Section 706 are unique to Alaska. These allegations, as well as the
ANILCA and TTRA claims, rightly belong in the Ninth Circuit with the
appeal from the decision in Village of Kake.163 Alaska’s chance of
prevailing in this manner is substantially higher, considering the lower
threshold of proof of injury and a 2002 exemption from the Roadless
Rule issued by the Forest Service itself.
Alaska’s demand that this ruling be upheld despite the District of
Alaska court’s decision has merit, because Alaska has a true injury to its
interests and because the Forest Service had its opportunity to evaluate
inclusion of the Tongass National Forest under the broad Roadless Rule.
Regardless of whether this was the most environmentally protective rule

158. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1123.
159. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (holding that while “NEPA does set forth significant
substantive goals for the Nation . . . its mandate to the agencies is essentially
procedural”); see also Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (“[W]e stated that NEPA, while establishing ‘significant
substantive goals for the Nation,’ imposes upon agencies duties that are
‘essentially procedural.’”); Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (“NEPA’s mandate ‘is essentially procedural . . . .’”); Ground Zero Ctr. for
Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“Because NEPA is an ‘essentially procedural’ statute . . . .”).
160. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1120.
161. See Cumings, supra note 18, at 816 (noting that the majority chastised the
lower court for “‘[not] giving due weight to the public’s interest in conservation
of natural resources’ . . . .” (citing Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1126)).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 601, et seq. (1980).
163. See Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t Agric., 776 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D.
Alaska 2011), argued, No. 11-35517 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2012)).
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possible, it was the rule lawfully chosen and promulgated by the Forest
Service and lawfully applied in the State of Alaska. Alaska’s interest is
best served in focusing on its individual state rule, rather than fighting
an uphill battle in the District Court of the District of Columbia.

IV. RESTING EASIER, IF NOT EASY: THE FUTURE OF THE ROADLESS
RULE
Regardless of whether the D.C. District Court transfers Alaska’s
challenge of the Roadless Rule to a more appropriate venue, the actual
chance of a permanent injunction of the Roadless Rule is substantially
lowered with the strong and reasonable voice of the Tenth Circuit
joining that of the Ninth. Had Alaska’s case been heard by the D.C.
District Court before the Tenth Circuit reinstated the Roadless Rule, or
had the Tenth Circuit affirmed the injunction issued by the Wyoming
District Court, the D.C. Circuit would have been compelled to choose
one side of a circuit split. It is entirely possible that the D.C. District
Court would have erred on the side of caution by enjoining the Rule.
This circuit split would most certainly have forced the Roadless Rule
before the Supreme Court.164 However, if the D.C. District Court and
Court of Appeals now enjoin the Roadless Rule, they will be the
minority voice in a circuit split, against the two circuits with the greatest
interest in a valid Roadless regulation.
The Roadless Rule continues to face opposition in Congress,165 in
the Senate,166 and in the courts.167 The danger in the Roadless Rule
getting to the Supreme Court is, of course, another permanent
injunction, without an appellate court reversal. Under the leadership of
Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court is notoriously reticent to affirm
the unruly Ninth Circuit judges.168
However, with the affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion by the
Tenth Circuit, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent refusal to grant

164. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT
UNITED STATES, 5–6 (2010) (explaining that a “court of appeals []
enter[ing] a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States
court of appeals on the same important matter” is one of the main issues the
Court considers in granting certiorari).
165. See Wilderness and Roadless Area Release Act of 2011, H.R. 1581, 112th
Cong. (2011).
166. See Wilderness and Roadless Area Release Act of 2011, S. 1087, 112th
Cong. (2011).
167. See Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119.
168. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder in the Court, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2007
(“The Supreme Court reviewed 22 cases from the 9th Circuit [during the 2006]
term, and it reversed or vacated 19 times.”).
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certiorari for the appeal of the Tenth Circuit’s decision, the burden is
now on Alaska to convince judges from the District Court and Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia that the reasoning of two separate
Appellate panels have been arbitrary and capricious. Even should the
State of Alaska succeed in convincing the D.C. Circuit to rule differently
than the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, convincing the Supreme Court to
uphold a nationwide injunction or repeal of the Roadless Rule seems
unlikely, especially given its refusal to hear the appeal of Wyoming.169

CONCLUSION
The tumultuous history of the Roadless Rule in the courts of this
nation continues, even after the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have issued
decisions recognizing its validity. The potential circuit split that once
seemed inevitable now seems more like a well-reasoned accord in the
higher courts on the legality and enforceability of the Roadless Rule.
Though the danger exists that the case will create a split and the
Supreme Court will seize the opportunity to grant certiorari and take on
the Ninth Circuit once again, it is unlikely to overrule the Tenth Circuit
as well. It seems, at least for now, that the Roadless Rule is safe to
continue protecting the pristine areas from exploitation and
overdevelopment—to keep the wild places wild and the wild things as
they are.

169. Greg Stohr, High Court Rejects Appeal Over Forest “Roadless Rule”,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com
/news/2012-10-01/high-court-rejects-appeal-over-forest-roadless-rule.

